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Abstract
This paper characterises optimal monetary policy in an economy with endoge-
nous ￿rm entry, a cash-in-advance constraint and preset wages. Firms must make
pro￿ts to cover entry costs; thus the markup on goods prices is e¢cient. However,
because leisure is not priced at a markup, the consumption-leisure tradeo⁄ is dis-
torted. Consequently, the real wage, hours and production are suboptimally low.
Due to the labour requirement in entry, insu¢cient labour supply also implies that
entry is too low. The paper shows that in the absence of ￿scal instruments such as
labour income subsidies, the optimal monetary policy under sticky wages achieves
higher welfare than under ￿exible wages. The policy maker uses the money supply
instrument to raise the real wage - the cost of leisure - above its ￿exible-wage level,
in response to expansionary shocks to productivity and entry costs. This raises
labour supply, expanding production and ￿rm entry.
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11 Introduction
The creation of new ￿rms and products, also referred to as extensive margin investment,
is of importance to macroeconomists and policy makers. It propagates and ampli￿es
shocks, see Bergin and Corsetti (2008). Changes in product diversity have an impact
on welfare and, if ignored, lead to a mismeasurement of price indices, see Broda and
Weinstein (2010). This paper asks whether, in the face of nominal rigidities, monetary
policy should be concerned with movements in the number of ￿rms.
The presence or absence of entry costs is crucial for the desirability of price markups
and pro￿ts. If the number of producers is ￿xed or entry is costless, pro￿ts are regarded as
an undesirable distortion. However, if ￿rm entry is costly, pro￿ts provide compensation
for startup costs and therefore an incentive to enter the market. The markup on goods
prices is in fact e¢cient and not by itself distortionary. Rather, it is the absence of a
markup on leisure that leads to a distortion of the leisure-consumption tradeo⁄ and, as
a result, to a misallocation of resources. Hours are too low, and therefore too little is
produced at both the intensive margin (production of goods) and at the extensive margin
(creation of ￿rms). Instead of removing the markup on goods prices, policy should aim
at bringing the markup on the price of leisure to the same level. As shown by Bilbiie
et al (2008), e¢ciency can be restored through a labour income subsidy that aligns the
two markups. The contribution of this paper is to show that under nominal rigidities,
monetary policy can be used to mimick the e⁄ect of a labour subsidy by manipulating the
real wage in response to shocks. The intuition is that the misalignment of the markups
on leisure and on consumption goods implies that the real wage, the price of leisure, is
ine¢ciently low.
The analysis is based on a stylised business cycle model with ￿rm entry as the only
form of investment. There are three distortions: monopolistic competition, a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint and preset wages.1 Firms have monopoly power over the goods
they produce. New ￿rms are established up to the point where monopoly pro￿ts just cover
entry costs, which are modelled as labour costs. The available (state-contingent) policy
instruments are lump sum taxes, the interest rate and the money supply. Distortionary
2￿scal instruments are unavailable. The policy maker commits to state-contingent paths
for the model variables which maximise welfare, taking as given the optimal decisions
of households and ￿rms. The main result is that optimal monetary policy under sticky
wages achieves higher welfare than under ￿exible wages, through its in￿uence on the
real wage. A policy of raising the real wage above its ￿exible-wage level in response to
expansionary shocks increases hours and expands both production and ￿rm entry.
Di⁄erently from cashless economy models, money is not determined residually here.
The CIA restriction on consumption purchases introduces a monetary friction and thus
a role for money. Once the interest rate is set to its optimal level, the money supply
can be used as a separate instrument for monetary policy. A zero net interest rate - the
Friedman Rule - is optimal. This is a standard result in CIA models. Setting a higher
interest rate taxes consumption relative to leisure, thereby worsening the aforementioned
allocative distortion. At the Friedman Rule, the role of the money supply policy depends
on whether wages are sticky or ￿exible; under ￿exible wages, allocations are given and the
money supply pins down the price level. Under sticky wages, given that the net interest
rate is set to zero, the money supply policy a⁄ects allocations.
A closely related study is Adªo et al (2003), hereafter ACT, who consider optimal
monetary policy in an economy with sticky prices where ￿scal policy is restricted to lump
sum taxation. They ￿nd that the optimal allocation under nominal rigidities and the
￿exible allocation are not the same when government spending shocks are taken into
consideration. There are three notable di⁄erences between this paper and ACT. First,
investment and entry are absent and monopolistic markups are ine¢cient in ACT. Second,
this paper abstracts from government spending shocks, while in ACT, such shocks are
the main driver of the result that replicating the ￿exible-price equilibrium is not welfare-
maximising. This paper instead highlights the role of entry costs in rendering the ￿exible
equilibrium ine¢cient and how this ine¢ciency can be addressed with monetary policy.
Third, ACT assume price stickiness while in this paper, prices are ￿exible and wages are
sticky.
Berentsen and Waller (2009) analyse optimal monetary policy in a model with endoge-
3nous entry and a microfounded demand for money. They ￿nd that the Friedman Rule is
optimal if the entry cost is modelled as a ￿xed cost.2 In sticky-price models with endoge-
nous ￿rm entry, Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie et al (2007) ￿nd that it is optimal
to fully stabilise goods prices, i.e. to replicate the ￿exible-price solution, while letting
the number of ￿rms ￿uctuate freely. In both studies, monetary frictions are ignored and
appropriate ￿scal policies ensure that the ￿exible-price allocation is e¢cient. This paper
instead considers monetary policy as a tool to stabilise ￿uctuations around a distorted
steady state, i.e. in the absence of short-run ￿scal policy. Faia (2010) studies optimal
monetary policy in a model of entry and oligopolistic competition. Finally, Bilbiie et al
(2011) describe the implications of endogenous product variety on the optimal long run
in￿ation rate.
2 Model
The economy is initially in a state of nature denoted by  0. Thereafter, it is hit by a series
of stochastic i.i.d. shocks to entry costs and to productivity. Every variable determined
at time   is indexed by the history of shocks that have occurred up to  , denoted by  t.
Let  t be the set of possible state histories. The probability of observing a particular
history is denoted by Pr( t).
2.1 Final Goods Sector
There is a mass   ( t) of di⁄erentiated intermediate goods, each produced by a monop-
olistically competitive ￿rm. A ￿rm is indexed by   2 [0   ( t)]. A ￿nal goods ￿rm
bundles these intermediate goods   (   t), taking as given their price   (   t), and sells
the output   ( t) to consumers at the competitive price   ( t). The optimisation problem
of the ￿nal goods ￿rm is to choose the amount of inputs that maximise pro￿ts, i.e. it
solves
max
Y (f;st)f2[0;N(st)]
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where     1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The ￿rst order
condition gives the following input demand function
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Substituting the input demand in the production function yields the price index
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2.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
Intermediate ￿rms use labour  c ( t) to produce di⁄erentiated goods. They set prices to
maximise pro￿ts,
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subject to the demand function given by (2) and the production function,
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where   ( t) is the wage rate and labour productivity   ( t) is exogenous with positive
support. The optimal price is a constant3 markup over marginal cost,
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Pro￿ts are a constant fraction of ￿rm revenue,
 
￿
   
t￿
=
1
 
 
￿
   
t￿
 
￿
   
t￿
. (5)
52.3 Returns to Product Diversity and Marginal Rate of Trans-
formation
Under endogenous ￿rm entry, the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator (1) exhibits increasing
returns to product diversity. This has implications for how, in the aggregate, inputs are
converted into ￿nal output. To understand the First Best e¢ciency conditions presented
in the next section, I now derive the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) for this
economy.
The symmetry of the intermediate ￿rms￿ output levels implies that the production
function of the ￿nal goods ￿rm reduces to
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From (6) we see that 1
￿￿1 represents the degree of increasing returns to product diversity.
If 1
￿￿1   0, there are increasing returns to product diversity, which is true for     1,
as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) assume. As   ! 1, i.e. as the elasticity of substitution
between inputs into ￿nal good production increases, the degree of increasing returns to
product diversity diminishes. See also Kim (2004). The symmetry of the intermediate
goods prices implies that the aggregate price index is
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The price index is decreasing in the number of di⁄erentied goods. As the number of
goods rises, it becomes less costly to produce the same amount of ￿nal output.
Next, I derive an aggregate production function for this economy by combining the
production function of the intermediate goods ￿rms (3) with the production function of
the ￿nal goods ￿rm under symmetry (6),
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where  C ( t) =   ( t) c ( t) is total labour used in the production of goods. Di⁄erenti-
6ating (8) with respect to labour, we have
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One additional labour unit is transformed into   ( t)
1
￿￿1   ( t) units of the ￿nal good.
In the standard model with a constant number of ￿rms, the MRT is simply equal to
productivity   ( t). Then the aggregate and ￿rm-speci￿c marginal rates of transformation
are the same. Here, the aggregate MRT contains the endogenous term   ( t)
1
￿￿1 owing
to the increasing returns to product diversity. Raising the number of ￿rms by one unit
gives rise to a positive externality on ￿nal output.
We can rewrite the aggregate production function (8) to express the economy-wide
e⁄ective labour requirement as
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The reduction in the labour requirement from increasing the number of ￿rms is then
obtained by di⁄erentiating this expression with respect to   ( t),
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2.4 Firm Entry
Starting up a ￿rm requires labour services  f ( t). Let   ( t) denote the entry cost in
the form of e⁄ective labour units   ( t) f ( t). The variable   ( t) is exogenous and has
positive support. In nominal terms, the entry cost is
  ( t)  ( t)
  ( t)
.
Households ￿nance the entry costs incurred by new ￿rms in exchange for claims on those
￿rms￿ pro￿ts. Firms must pay the entry cost anew each period.
72.5 Households
There exists a continuum of measure 1 of households. As in Erceg et al (2000), each
household, indexed by   2 [0 1], supplies a di⁄erentiated labour type to a competitive
labour packer, who produces a labour bundle subject to the production function  ( t) =
￿R 1
0  (   t)
￿￿1
￿   
￿ ￿
￿￿1
,     1, and sells it to intermediate ￿rms and to entrants at price
  ( t).4
Households choose paths for consumption   ( t), wages and asset holdings to maximise
expected lifetime utility,
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subject to a sequence of budget constraints explained below, labour demand from the
labour packer  (   t) = [  (   t)   ( t)]
￿￿  ( t), and a cash-in-advance constraint,
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The parameter C is the households￿ subjective discount factor,   (￿) is strictly increasing
and concave,   (￿) is strictly increasing and convex. At the start of period  , households
make a portfolio allocation decision in the asset market facing the constraint
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Total household wealth in currency terms is denoted by W ( t). Households receive a
monetary transfer   ( t) from the government and buy four types of assets. Money
holdings are denoted by   ( t).   ( t) are one-period nominal risk-free bonds5 that have
a price of one currency unit and a return of  ( t) ￿ 1, the gross interest rate, next
period.  ( t  t+1) are nominal state-contingent bonds6 that cost  ( t+1j t) and pay a
return of one currency unit in period   + 1 if and only if the economy is in the state of
8nature  t+1. A share is denoted by   (   t). Its price is a share of the ￿rm entry cost and
its payo⁄ is a share of the entrant￿s monopoly pro￿ts earned at the end of period   and
paid out as dividends at the start of period   + 1.
After the closure of asset markets, production takes place and goods markets open.
The agents work and use money to make consumption purchases. At the end of the
period, they receive labour income and pay a lump sum tax   ( t) to the government. At
the beginning of period   + 1, households have a stock of wealth given by
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.
Income from asset holdings consists of money carried over from the previous period,
interest income on bond holdings and dividends on share holdings. Initial household
wealth is zero, such that W ( 0) = 0.7 At the beginning of time,   ( 0) ￿rms are given.
I rule out Ponzi schemes on asset holdings by assuming
lim
T!1
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The ￿rst order conditions for asset holdings imply
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Equation (14) de￿nes the households￿ stochastic discount factor, the marginal utility
growth of nominal wealth, given a particular state of nature in  +1. The period-zero value
of consumption in period   + 1 must obey  ( t+1j 0) =  ( tj 0) ( t+1j t). Combining
9(14) and (15) yields an arbitrage condition between risk-free and state-contingent bonds
P
st+1jst  ( t+1j t) = 1
R(st). Equation (16) states that the cost of setting up a ￿rm must
equal pro￿ts discounted by the interest rate. Under ￿exible wages, (17) equates the real
wage to a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption,
adjusted for the cost of holding money,
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An alternative assumption is that wages are predetermined; that is, the wage rate in
place in period  ,   ( t), is set in period  ￿1. This particular form of wage stickiness is
chosen for simplicity. Under preset wages, the ￿rst order condition for wages is
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Due to imperfect competition in the labour market, labour supply is reduced and hence
leisure is increased relative to the perfectly competitive case. Imperfect competition in
the goods market has a similar e⁄ect: output and labour hours are lower than under
perfect competition. Thus, leisure is sold at a discount, while consumption goods are
sold at a markup. The theory of optimal taxation tells us that we want markups to be
equal across all goods (consumption goods and leisure). Therefore, a markup or tax on
leisure, equivalent to a labour subsidy, would be desirable.
There are two reasons for assuming sticky wages instead of sticky prices. First, Lewis
(2009) shows that, in a model with endogenous entry, wage stickiness helps to reconcile the
model impulse responses of pro￿ts and entry to a monetary stimulus with those observed
in the data. The second reason is analytical convenience. Under price ￿exibility, pro￿ts
are a constant fraction of revenue, which simpli￿es considerably the optimality condition
for share holdings and, as a result, the policy problem.
102.6 Government
The government makes a monetary transfer to the household in the asset market ￿nanced
with an expansion of the money stock  s ( t) and with lump sum taxes collected in the
goods market. Thus, the government budget constraint is
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2.7 Market Clearing
Labour is used for production and for ￿rm startups,
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Using the respective production functions, labour market clearing requires
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The market clearing conditions for ￿nal goods, for the two types of bonds, for shares and
for money are, respectively,
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De￿nition 1: An imperfectly competitive equilibrium is a set of prices, allocations
and policies, such that: ￿rst, the optimality conditions of the ￿nal goods ￿rm, the in-
termediate goods ￿rms, the labour packer and the household are satis￿ed; second, all
markets clear.
113 First Best Allocation
The First Best allocation is de￿ned as the allocation chosen by a benevolent social planner
who maximises the utility of the representative household subject to the resource con-
straint. It is a useful benchmark with which one can compare any constrained-e¢cient
allocation. The First Best problem is as follows,
max
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subject to the resource constraint,
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The resource constraint (22) is derived by substituting the ￿nal goods production function
under symmetry (6) in the labour market clearing condition (19). It states that the total
amount of (e⁄ective) labour is equal to labour used in the production of goods plus labour
required for ￿rm entry. The First Best allocation satis￿es
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Equation (23) is an intrasectoral e¢ciency condition. It states that the marginal rate of
substitution between labour and consumption,  L ( t)  C ( t), must equal the aggregate
marginal rate of transformation. See (9). Equation (24) is an intersectoral e¢ciency
condition. It states that the cost (in e⁄ective labour units) of setting up one additional
￿rm,   ( t), must equal the reduction in the number of e⁄ective labour units required in
the production of goods, i.e. the e¢ciency gain, brought about by this extra ￿rm. See
(10).
Let us de￿ne two wedges, an intrasectoral wedge ￿( t) and an intersectoral wedge
￿( t). The ￿rst is the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between labour and
12consumption to the marginal rate of transformation,
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.
The second is the di⁄erence between the marginal product of new ￿rms in the goods
production sector and their marginal cost, in terms of labour units,
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.
In the First Best allocation, the two wedges are constant: ￿FB ( t) = 1 and ￿FB ( t) = 0.
Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, such that  C ( t) =
  ( t)
￿1 and  L ( t) = 1, equation (23) becomes
  ( t)
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= 1. (25)
Thus, labour employed in goods production is constant and equal to 1. Substituting this
result in the resource constraint (22) and rearranging yields the number of ￿rms as a
function of the exogenous variables,
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The number of ￿rms is proportional to productivity and inversely proportional to the
entry cost. Given the number of ￿rms, we can compute consumption using (25),
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Expressing consumption as a function of exogenous variables only, we have
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Thus, consumption is increasing in productivity, with elasticity ￿
￿￿1, and decreasing in
13the entry cost, with elasticity ￿ 1
￿￿1. Finally, substituting the number of ￿rms (26) and
consumption (27) in the resource constraint (22), we ￿nd that labour in the First Best is
constant8,
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. (28)
To summarise, the equations (26), (27) and (28) describe the First Best allocation.
4 Optimal Policy
This section derives the optimal policy following the approach in Adªo et al (2003).
First, I collapse all equilibrium conditions into a single equation - the implementability
condition - that, together with the resource constraint, restricts the set of implementable
allocations for any given policy sequences. Second, I show that under both ￿exible and
sticky wages, the optimal interest rate policy is to follow the Friedman Rule. Third, I
characterise the optimal allocations under this policy by deriving the optimal intrasectoral
and intersectoral wedges under ￿exible wages and under sticky wages. I show that the
￿exible-wage optimal allocation coincides with the sticky-wage optimal allocation only if
labour supply is inelastic.
4.1 Imperfectly Competitive Equilibrium: Compact Form
De￿nition 2: More compactly, we can de￿ne a (symmetric) equilibrium as a set of
prices,
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and policies,
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,
14such that:
1. the present-value household budget constraint is satis￿ed,
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2. the resource constraint is satis￿ed,9
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3. the following equilibrium conditions are satis￿ed,
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as well as
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under ￿exible wages, or
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,
under sticky wages.
15Notice that pro￿ts and asset holdings have been eliminated in the above equilibrium
representation. The present value household budget constraint (29) and the free entry
condition (30) are derived as follows. Using (5), (6), (7) and (20), ￿rm pro￿ts can be
expressed as a fraction of total consumption expenditure divided by the number of active
￿rms,
 
￿
   
t￿
=
1
 
  ( t)  ( t)
  ( t)
. (31)
Under the assumption of complete contingent claims markets, one can write the consumer
budget constraint in present value form. First, we weight each equation (12) by the
period-0 value of wealth in state  t,  ( tj 0). Summing the resulting equations across
states and dates and using the no-Ponzi game condition (13) eliminates bond holdings
from the budget constraint. Second, we substitute the cash-in-advance constraint (11),
holding with equality, to eliminate money holdings. Third, we substitute out shares using
the market clearing condition (21). Finally, to derive (29), we eliminate ￿rm pro￿ts using
expression (31). Substituting (31) in the ￿rst order condition for shares (16) yields the
free entry condition (30).
4.2 Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The objective of the planner is to choose the model variables so as to maximise the
utility of the representative household, taking as given the optimality conditions of the
households and the ￿rms, as well as market clearing. The constraints of the planner
problem are all the equilibrium conditions given above. The idea of an implementability
condition is that not all of these constraints are restrictive for the planner. By substituting
out certain variables (in particular, the prices), the constraints can be condensed in
only one equation in addition to the resource constraint. The planner then chooses the
allocations that maximise utility, given this implementability condition and the resource
constraint.
The planner is free to set a path for lump-sum taxes   ( t) to satisfy (29), while the
variables   (   t),  ( t+1j 0),  ( t+1j t),   ( t) and   ( t) adjust to satisfy the ￿rst ￿ve
equilibrium conditions in Section 4.1. The remaining equilibrium conditions restricting
16the planner problem are the resource constraint (22), the free entry condition (30) and
the relevant wage setting equation: (17) under ￿exible wages or (18) under sticky wages.
Under ￿exible wages, the set of implementable allocations,
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is restricted by the implementability condition
  ( t) C ( t)  ( t)
   ( t) ( t)
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t￿
, (32)
and the resource constraint (22) for any path of the interest rate  ( t). Equation (32) is
derived by combining the free entry condition (30) with the wage setting equation (17)
to eliminate   ( t).
Under sticky wages, the wage setting condition is given by (18). Solving the free entry
condition for the price level and substituting the result in the wage setting equation to
eliminate   ( t) gives
1 =
 
  ￿ 1
P
stjst￿1 Pr( tj t￿1) L ( t) ( t)
P
stjst￿1 Pr( tj t￿1)
UC(st)Z(st)C(st)
￿F(st)R(st)2N(st) ( t)
.
Note that we have cancelled   ( t), which is known in   ￿ 1. Rearranging and using the
law of iterated expectations yields the implementability condition under sticky wages,
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The constraints of the policy problem are the implementability constraint (33) and the
resource constraint (22).
Proposition 1: The set of implementable allocations under ￿exible wages is contained
in the corresponding set under sticky wages. Therefore, the optimal allocation under sticky
wages makes households at least as well o⁄ as under ￿exible wages.
Proof: For any interest rate path f ( t)st2Stg1
t=0, the implementability condition
17under sticky wages (33) is the expected value of the implementability condition under
￿exible wages (32), and the resource constraint is binding in both cases.
Let C
t ( t￿1)Pr( t) be the Lagrange multiplier on (33). Then the planner problem
under sticky wages is as follows,
max
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t=0
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t=0
L,
where the Lagrangian is
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,
with  ( ￿1) = 0. Under ￿exible wages,  ( t￿1) is replaced with  ( t).
Following Adªo et al (2003), I ￿rst derive the optimal interest rate policy before
solving for the optimal allocations under this policy. This method di⁄ers from the Ramsey
approach to optimal policy of ￿rst solving the primal problem for the optimal allocations
and then backing out the policies that support these allocations.
4.3 Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem under sticky wages is to choose a path for the interest
rate f( ( t) ￿ 1)st2Stg1
t=0 to maximise L. It is straightforward to show that the Friedman
Rule is optimal irrespective of nominal rigidities.
Proposition 2: The Friedman Rule is optimal, i.e. the optimal gross interest rate is
 ( t) = 1 for all dates and states.
Proof: The ￿rst derivative of the Lagrangian is
 L
  ( t)
= ￿2C
t Pr
￿
 
t￿
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t￿1￿   ( t) C ( t)  ( t)
   ( t) ( t)
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.
We have @L
@R(st)   0 for  ( t￿1)   0. Welfare, as summarised by L, decreases as the
18interest rate increases, given the non-negativity constraint on the net interest rate and
the fact that the Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive as long as we are away from the
First Best. It follows that the nominal interest rate should be as low as possible. Given
the lower bound of unity on the gross interest rate, this implies that the Friedman Rule,
 ( t) = 1, is optimal.
As can be seen from (17), the money distortion a⁄ects the intratemporal consumption-
leisure tradeo⁄ decision. It drives a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labour and the real wage. The higher the interest rate, the
greater is this wedge. The optimality of the Friedman Rule is a standard result in the
literature following Ireland (1996) and is shown to hold under more general conditions in
Correia et al (2008). Notice that at the Friedman Rule, the cash-in-advance constraint
is no longer binding and hence the level of real money holdings is indeterminate. This
real indeterminacy at the corner solution can be ignored if we consider limiting equilibria
where the interest rate approaches unity.
4.4 Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
At the Friedman Rule, the planner problem is written as before, with  ( t) set equal to
1 in L. Again, under ￿exible wages,  ( t￿1) is replaced with  ( t).
Flexible Wages
The ￿rst order conditions for the policy problem under ￿exible wages imply the following
intra- and intersectoral optimal wedges,
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.
19Assuming log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, ￿f ( t) = 1 and the optimal
allocation can be written recursively as follows,
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Under ￿exible wages, the Friedman Rule is optimal and implements the unique allocation
given by (36) to (38), while it does not pin down the price level. At the Friedman Rule,
allocations are una⁄ected by the money supply policy. The size of the money stock
a⁄ects only (and indeed pins down) the price level   ( t) through the cash-in-advance
constraint. The remaining nominal variables, i.e. ￿rm prices   (   t), wages   ( t) and
pro￿ts  (   t) are then determined residually through (4), (17) and (31), respectively.
The optimal allocation can thus be implemented with a multiplicity of money supply
and price level sequences. This is the nominal indeterminacy under ￿exible wages as
explained in Adªo et al (2003).
The wedge between the First Best and the optimal allocation under ￿exible wages is
constant and equals the joint markup in goods and labour markets, ￿
￿￿1
￿
￿￿1. To see this,
compare equations (26)-(28) with equations (36)-(38). Note that the wage markup has
a similar e⁄ect as the goods markup: it makes leisure cheaper relative to consumption.
A constant labour income subsidy equal to the joint markup aligns the decentralised
allocation with the First Best. The reason, as pointed out in Bilbiie et al (2008), is
that the presence of ￿rm entry costs makes goods markups e¢cient. The result is a
misalignment of markups between consumption and leisure, distorting the labour supply
decision. A markup on leisure is needed to restore e¢ciency. Here, the required markup is
higher than in Bilbiie et al (2008) due to monopolistic competition in the labour market.
20Sticky Wages
With ￿exible wages, only one margin is distorted: the leisure-consumption choice. Imper-
fect competition in product and labour markets gives rise to a constant wedge between
the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
The only handle on this wedge is the nominal interest rate, and the optimal policy is
to minimise the wedge by implementing the Friedman Rule. In contrast, with sticky
wages, shocks create an additional distortion. Through the money supply instrument,
monetary policy can use this additional distortion to its advantage by (partially) undoing
the distortion that is present under ￿exible wages whenever a shock hits.
The ￿rst order conditions of the policy problem under sticky wages imply the following
intra- and intersectoral optimal wedges,
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Under sticky wages, the Friedman Rule is again optimal. At the Friedman Rule, there
are multiple implementable allocations associated with di⁄erent money supplies, which
all satisfy the implementability condition. Within the set of implementable allocations,
the policy maker picks the optimal one, which in general does not coincide with the
￿exible-wage allocation.
Proposition 3: In general, the optimal allocation under sticky wages welfare-dominates
the optimal allocation under ￿exible wages.
Proof: Comparing the sticky-wage optimal wedges (39) and (40) with the ￿exible-
wage optimal wedges (34) and (35), we see that only if  ( t) = 1 does the ￿exible-
21wage allocation satisfy the planner￿s ￿rst order conditions under sticky wages. Then
￿f ( t) = ￿s ( t) and the optimal wedges coincide.
This is the case of inelastic labour supply studied by Bilbiie et al (2008). Intuitively,
when labour supply is ￿xed, policy cannot manipulate the leisure-consumption tradeo⁄
to its advantage. Then sticky wages do not provide monetary policy with a lever to
improve upon the ￿exible-wage allocation.
The non-optimality of the ￿exible solution is reminiscent of the ￿nding in Adªo et
al (2003). In their ￿xed-variety model with pre-set prices, government spending shocks
drive a wedge between the optimal allocations under price stickiness and the ￿exible-price
allocations. They assume, as I do here, that cash is required for goods purchases and that
lump sum taxes are available while distortionary ￿scal policy is not. The optimal plan is to
follow the Friedman Rule and, in addition, to use the money supply to reduce the cyclical
wedges that result from exogenous changes in government spending. In their model,
government spending diverts labour away from the production of goods used for private
consumption. In this model, entry costs have the same e⁄ect. The extra labour needed to
produce government consumption or to create ￿rms gives rise to disutility and alters the
marginal rate of substitution. Under nominal rigidities and a cash-in-advance constraint,
the policy maker can in￿uence the amount of consumption (and hence the marginal rate
of substitution) through cash injections. There are two important di⁄erences between
this paper and Adªo et al (2003), however. First, the marginal rate of transformation
is di⁄erent here because of the increasing returns to variety in the aggregate production
function, as explained in Section 2.3. Second, in both papers the markup on goods and
leisure should be aligned. However, the price markup should be reduced to zero in Adªo
et al (2003), while in this paper, the markup on leisure should be raised to the markup
on goods. This is due to the presence of entry costs, which implies that pro￿ts are not
distortionary but instead necessary for a ￿rm to enter and produce.
The assumption of a labour requirement for ￿rm startups is important for the results
of this paper. Since the wage rate is part of the entry cost, wage stickiness a⁄ects
the entry decision and it is through this e⁄ect that monetary policy can in￿uence the
22investment margin. In the Appendix, I show a variant of the model in which entry costs
are speci￿ed in terms of ￿nal output. In that model, wage stickiness does not alter the
set of implementable allocations that the policy maker faces. This is because wages are
not part of entry costs and any wage setting restriction therefore does not distort the
entry decision. As a result, the optimal allocations are the same under sticky wages as
under ￿exible wages (with price rigidities, the optimal allocations are di⁄erent, however).
Lewis (2009) compares impulse responses to a monetary policy shock to their empirical
counterparts, for di⁄erent variants of the endogenous entry model. Qualitatively, the best-
performing model is one in which entry costs are in labour units, rather than in terms
of ￿nal output, and wages are sticky. This evidence leads me to prefer the benchmark
model to the modi￿ed version.
5 An Example and Some Intuition
Under log consumption utility and linear labour disutility, the optimal wedges under
sticky wages are as follows,
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Together with the resource constraint (22) and the implementability constraint,
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they determine   ( t),  ( t),   ( t), and  ( t￿1).
In the following, I provide a two-state example10 for the general case where labour
supply is elastic. Consider two states with equal probability and the following calibration.
The elasticity of substitution between goods is set to   = 3 8 as in Bilbiie et al (2008),
23which is consistent with the estimate in Lewis and Poilly (2011). Labour types are
assumed to be somewhat more substitutable,   = 6. Productivity in the pre-shock state
  ( 0) is normalised to 1. As for the calibration of period-0 entry costs, I use the value
  ( 0) = 0 004, which is close to the one in Barseghyan and DiCecio (2010), according to
whom a ratio F
Z = 0 0038 matches legal entry fees for the US as a fraction of output per
worker.
Table 1 shows the responses of the number of ￿rms, consumption and labour to
changes in productivity and entry costs. It compares the First Best allocation to the
optimal allocation under ￿exible wages and under sticky wages. Notice that all values
have been normalised by the period-0 values in the decentralised economy. For example,
in the pre-shock period, the number of ￿rms in the First Best relative to the number of
￿rms in the decentralised steady state is 1.6. In period 1, the First Best number of ￿rms
is 2.4 in the good state and 0.8 in the bad state, again relative to the pre-shock level in
the decentralised economy.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
Under sticky wages, the number of ￿rms, consumption and labour increase more in
response to a positive productivity shock than under ￿exible wages. In particular, the
expansion in labour under sticky wages allows for a larger increase in the production of
both ￿rms and goods. Similarly, a decrease in the entry cost induces the optimal policy
under sticky wages to raise labour, such that the number of ￿rms and consumption
increase more than under ￿exible wages. Importantly, the optimal sticky-wage allocation
is more dispersed across states of nature. In response to an expansionary shock, the
policy maker exploits the degree of freedom given by the wage rigidity to address the
undersupply of labour and the underproduction of goods and ￿rms. As labour rises
beyond its steady state level, both consumption and the number of ￿rms expand more
than in the ￿exible-wage allocation.11 The responses of the real wage to the shocks are
identical to those of consumption. The real wage increases more and thus leisure becomes
more expensive in the sticky-wage allocation than in the ￿exible-wage allocation.
To summarise, the nominal wage rigidity, combined with the money supply instru-
24ment, allows the policy maker to manipulate the real wage in the face of shocks, a⁄ecting
directly the consumption-leisure tradeo⁄ decision. Optimal policy chooses a di⁄erent allo-
cation than the ￿exible-wage allocation by introducing a markup on leisure that is absent
under ￿exible wages. Monetary policy can mimick the e⁄ect of a labour supply subsidy,
which has the same e⁄ect to make leisure more expensive relative to consumption.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the implications of ￿rm entry for optimal monetary policy. The
economy has three distortions: product and labour markets are imperfectly competitive,
wages are set in advance, and consumption purchases must be made with money. The
cash-in-advance restriction is undone via the Friedman Rule, which aligns the returns
on bonds and money. The markup in the goods market is e¢cient, because pro￿ts are
needed to cover the entry cost. However, the absence of a markup on leisure implies that
leisure is too cheap relative to consumption goods. Therefore, labour is suboptimally low.
Due to the labour requirement for establishing new ￿rms, this has a negative e⁄ect on
entry. Even though implementing the ￿exible allocation, i.e. removing the sticky-wage
distortion, is feasible, it is not welfare-maximising. In response to expansionary shocks
to productivity and entry costs, the optimal policy implies a larger increase in hours,
more consumption and higher entry than is observed in the ￿exible economy. The wage
rigidity, combined with the money supply instrument, provides the policy maker with a
tool to increase the real wage, moving it closer to its e¢cient level, in response to such
shocks. As a result, more labour is employed at both margins: at the intensive margin
(production of goods) and at the extensive margin (￿rm entry).
25Notes
1Notice that entry itself does not give rise to a (net) externality under monopolistic
competition ￿ la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In particular, there is a positive externality
of entry on consumer surplus through an increase in product diversity. Entry also has
a negative externality on ￿rm pro￿ts through a ￿business-stealing e⁄ect￿. These two
e⁄ects o⁄set each other, such that the net externality is zero. For more details on this,
see Bilbiie et al (2008, 2011) and Lewis (2010).
2With an increasing entry cost due to a congestion externality in entry, deviations from
the Friedman Rule are needed to reduce ine¢ciently high entry levels. Such congestion
e⁄ects are beyond the scope of this paper.
3Under oligopolistic competition with strategic interactions, the markup may well
be a (negative) function of the number of producers. Although a possibly interesting
extension, I abstract from markup endogeneity in order to keep the model as simple as
possible. See Lewis (2010), which takes up this issue in a non-monetary model, focussing
on optimal taxation.
4To simplify notation, I drop the  -subscript from here on, given that households are
symmetric.
5Risk-free bonds are needed in order to de￿ne the interest rate.
6I introduce state-contingent bonds in order to simplify the policy problem. Under
complete ￿nancial markets one can write the household budget constraint in present value
form, which then becomes a single implementability constraint for the policy maker.
7This is consistent with the result in Chamley (1986) that only initial wealth should
be taxed, and at a rate of 100%.
8Note that labour is constant only in the log utility case.
9If the resource constraint and the household budget constraint are satis￿ed, the gov-
ernment budget constraint is satis￿ed by Walras￿ Law.
10A closed-form solution does not exist even for the two-period two-state case, which
is a non-linear system of seven equations in seven unknowns.
11In the online appendix, I show (for the case of log-linear utility) that if hours, con-
26sumption and entry were instead below their ￿exible-wage levels, both the intra- and
intersectoral wedge would be higher than under ￿exible wages, which cannot be optimal.
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28Table 1: Two-state Example
Productivity Shock
Number of Firms Consumption Labour
t = 0 t = 1 t = 0 t = 1 t = 0 t = 1
First Best 1.629 2.443 1.190 2.064 1.113 1.113
1.629 0.814 1.190 0.465 1.113 1.113
Flex-wage 1 1.5 1 1.734 1 1
1 0.5 1 0.390 1 1
Sticky-wage 1 1.593 1 1.763 1 1.007
1 0.472 1 0.385 1 0.997
Productivity Z
￿
s1￿
takes on the values 1:5 and 0:5 with equal probability.
Entry Cost Shock
Number of Firms Consumption Labour
t = 0 t = 1 t = 0 t = 1 t = 0 t = 1
First Best 1.629 2.171 1.190 1.319 1.113 1.113
1.629 1.303 1.190 1.099 1.113 1.113
Flex-wage 1 1.333 1 1.108 1 1
1 0.800 1 0.923 1 1
Sticky-wage 1 1.357 1 1.113 1 1.001
1 0.787 1 0.919 1 0.999
The entry cost F
￿
s1￿
takes on the values 0:003 and 0:005 with equal prob-
ability.
29Appendix: Entry Cost in Terms of Final Output
I now assume that the exogenous entry cost is given in terms of ￿nal output instead
of e⁄ective labour units as in the benchmark model. The new entry cost is denoted by
 o ( t). Goods market clearing is no longer   ( t) =   ( t) but instead
 
￿
 
t￿
=  
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t￿
+  
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t￿
 o
￿
 
t￿
. (41)
Total output comprises consumption purchases and entry costs. Combining (41) with
￿rm pro￿ts (5), the ￿nal goods ￿rm￿s production function under symmetry (6), and the
price index (7), real ￿rm pro￿ts are
 (   t)
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. (42)
The household budget constraint becomes
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The ￿rst order condition for shares is therefore
 
￿
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t￿
=
 (   t)
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Rearranging and replacing real pro￿ts using (42), we get the free entry condition,
 o
￿
 
t￿
 
￿
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1
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+  o
￿
 
t￿
￿
. (43)
Combining the symmetric ￿nal goods production function   ( t) =   ( t)
1+ 1
￿￿1   (   t)
with the intermediate ￿rms￿ production function   ( t)  (   t) =   ( t) ( t), we have
30the economy￿s aggregate production function,
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Di⁄erentiating (44) with respect to   ( t), we can derive the marginal product, in terms
of ￿nal output, of one additional ￿rm,
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Combining equations (41) and (44) yields the aggregate resource constraint,
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The remaining equilibrium conditions are as in the benchmark model.
First Best Allocation
The First Best problem is as follows,
max
f(C(st);L(st);N(st))st2Stg
1
t=0
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X
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,
subject to the resource constraint (46). The ￿rst order conditions satisfy
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. (48)
The intrasectoral e¢ciency condition (47) is the same as in the benchmark model: the
marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption must equal the aggregate
marginal rate of transformation. Neither the MRS nor the MRT depends on the speci￿-
cation of the entry cost. The intersectoral e¢ciency condition (48) is, however, di⁄erent
from the benchmark model. It states that the cost (in terms of consumption units) of
31setting up an additional ￿rm,  o ( t), must equal the gain in consumption output that the
extra ￿rm gives rise to, i.e. the marginal product of a ￿rm (45). Under log consumption
utility and linear labour disutility, we can derive the recursive system,
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Labour is constant in the First Best allocation and unambiguously higher here than in
the benchmark model,
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.
When entry costs are speci￿ed in units of consumption, the number of ￿rms in the
First Best responds more to productivity shocks and to entry cost shocks than in the
benchmark model. The elasticities ￿￿1
￿￿2 and ￿￿￿1
￿￿2 are greater (in absolute terms) than 1
and ￿1, respectively. In steady state, the number of ￿rms and consumption are higher
than in the benchmark model.
Implementability Condition and Planner Problem
The set of implementable allocations for
￿
(  ( t)  ( t)   ( t))st2St
￿1
t=0 is restricted by
the free entry condition (43) and the resource constraint (46) for any path of the interest
rate  ( t) ￿ 1.
Notice that here, the wage setting scheme does not matter for the optimal allocations.
I.e. if there is wage stickiness, this does not restrict the set of implementable allocations
for the policy maker. This is because the wage rate no longer enters the free entry
condition and therefore does not a⁄ect the investment margin. Since wage stickiness
does not matter, monetary policy cannot be used to select allocations. The absence of a
labour requirement to set up a ￿rm removes the potency of monetary policy instrument
32under sticky wages to a⁄ect the investment margin. Lump sum taxes must adjust to
satisfy the household budget constraint and the money stock must adjust to satisfy the
cash-in-advance constraint.
In the online appendix, I explore the case where entry costs are speci￿ed in terms of
￿nal output and prices are set in advance. While the ￿exible-price allocation is attain-
able under sticky prices, it is not optimal. Unlike wage stickiness, price stickiness does
a⁄ect the optimal allocations: it a⁄ects the real value of ￿rm pro￿ts and hence the free
entry condition. A full characterisation of the optimal allocations under sticky prices is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Let C
t Pr( t) ( t) be the Lagrange multiplier on the free entry condition. The plan-
ner problem is as follows,
max
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.
Optimal Interest Rate Policy
The interest rate policy problem is to choose a path for the interest rate f( ( t) ￿ 1)st2Stg1
t=0
to maximise Lo. The ￿rst order condition is
 Lo
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t Pr
￿
 
t￿
 
￿
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 o
￿
 
t￿
.
Because this expression is negative, the Friedman Rule is optimal.
33Optimal Allocations under the Friedman Rule
Under the Friedman Rule, we can derive and rearrange the ￿rst order conditions of the
policy problem to express the allocation as follows,
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.
Labour is constant and equal to its First Best level. The number of ￿rms in the optimal
allocation is smaller than in the First Best.
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